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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

~~IN~~ MISSION GENEVA

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

RUOMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK

BT

001 [REDACTED] PM 3 30

~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT [REDACTED] INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA  
115 ATHENS 114 LONDON 141 USUN 185 FROM GENEVA AUG 22 7 PM

FOR BALL FROM ACHESON

EXD 1 S - TAG

REF: OUR TEL 181.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-152

By 100 NARA, Date 1-21-04

POLICY FOLLOWING FAILURE OF GENEVA.

THE PURPOSE OF THE GENEVA EFFORT WAS TO END THE OMINOUS QUARREL  
BETWEEN OUR ALLIES OVER CYPRUS BY AN AGREED SETTLEMENT WHICH  
WOULD BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE ISLAND. THIS EFFORT  
HAS FAILED AND BOTH THE FOCUS OF OUR PURPOSE AND THE MEANS  
CFN 462 115 114 141 185 22 7 451

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TO BE USED MUST CHANGE. OUR PURPOSE NOW MUST BE TO  
FRUSTRATE THE OBVIOUS CONSEQUENCE OF THE MOSCOW-CYPRUS  
AXIS, THE CONVERSION OF CYPURS INTO A RUSSIAN MEDITERREANEAN  
SATELLITE. SINCE WE CANNOT DO THIS BY GREEK-TURKISH  
AGREEMENT, WE MUST USE THE MORE EFFECTIVE OF THE TWO NATIONS  
FOR OUR PURPOSES, TRYING TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE TO OUR  
RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER. OF THE TWO, GREECE, FEEBLE AS SHE  
IS, HAS THE GREATER CAPABILITY OF ACHIEVING OUR END. WHATEVER  
CAPABILITY TURKEY MAY HAVE OF ACHIEVING HER PURPOSE, WHICH  
IS PARTITION OF THE ISLAND, SHE HAS NO CAPABILITY OF  
ACHIEVING OURS. IN FACT, ~~PERHAPS~~ ONCE SAID TO US THAT IF  
TURKEY GOT HER FAIR SHARE OF CYPRUS, HE DID NOT CARE WHETHER  
THE OTHER HALF WENT TO GREECE, MAKARIOS OR MOSCOW. WHILE  
THIS WAS LARGELY EXASPERATED TALK, IT SHOWS HOW FAR APART OUR  
OBJECTIVES ARE: AND TURKEY'S CAPABILITIES ARE ONLY ADAPTED  
TO HER OBJECTIVES, NOT TO OURS.

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IF WE MUST WORK WITH GREECE, WE MUST ADAPT OUR METHODS TO THE TIME AVAILABLE, TO THE NEED FOR KEEPING THE TURKS FROM MILITARY INTERFERENCE, AND TO A GREEK PLAN FOR GETTING CONTROL ON CYPRUS.

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AS TO THE TIME AVAILABLE, THERE SHOULD BE NINETY DAYS OR MORE - - THAT IS, UNTIL THE UNGA DOES SOMETHING FOOLISH. THIS SHOULD NOT BE UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER, WHEN THE UNGA GETS THROUGH ITS TIME-CONSUMING PRELIMINARIES - - ELECTIONS, CHINESE DELEGATION, GENERAL DEBATE, ETC. - - AND BEGINS COMMITTEE WORK. OF COURSE, ~~MACARIO~~ MIGHT PROCLAIM INDEPENDENCE AND SIGN A RUSSIAN DEFENSE TREATY, BUT HE HAS SOME OUTER PRESSURE NOT TO UPSET THE UNGA APPLECAKE (WHICH A COUP MIGHT DO). FURTHERMORE, IF THE HATED GENEVA TALKS HAD BEEN ABANDONED, HE MIGHT EAVE UP ON THE RUSSIAN LIAISON. THIS TENDENCY TO RELAX MIGHT BE AIDED IF THE TURKS WERE NOT GIVEN PROVOCATION FOR MILITARY ACTION AND IF WE HELPED TO STAND THEM OFF.

I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME AVAILABLE IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE GREEKS TO TAKE WHATEVER PRELIMINARY MEASURES THEY MAY NEED TO GET SUFFICIENT CONTROL OF THE SITUATION TO TAKE CYPRUS AWAY FROM MAKARIOS BY ENOSIS (IF THEY CAN DO IT AT ALL; AND IF THEY CANNOT DO IT, NO ONE CAN). THIS BRINGS US TO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO KEEP THE TURKS QUIET WHILE THE GREEKS ARE PREPARING THE GROUND.

HERE THE ESSENTIAL FIRST REQUIREMENT IS TO DEPRIVE CFN - NONE

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MAKARIOS, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, OF THE POWER TO RESUME PROVOCATION OF TURKEY, AS HE DID TWO WEEKS AGO IN THE KOKKINA MANSOURA AREA. THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY GRIVAS, AS COMMANDER OF NAT'L GUARD (WHO, RELIEVED OF THREAT OF GENEVA CONDITIONS, WOULD BE BACK ON BOARD THE ENOSIS TEAM), PLUS ARRANGEMENTS BY THE GOG FOR THE RELIEF OF NAT'L GUARD UNITS.

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IN EXPLOSIVE AREAS BY DISCIPLINED REGULAR GREEK UNITS. A NEXT STEP MIGHT BE COOPERATION BETWEEN GREEK AND TURKISH MILITARY COMMANDERS THROUGH THIMAYYA TO OPEN BLOCKED ROUTES, RESUME CIVILIAN TRADE AND TRAFFIC AND, AGAIN, WHERE POSSIBLE, REPLACE NAT'L GUARD UNITS BY REGULAR GREEK TROOPS. GREECE SHOULD ALSO MAKE EFFORTS TO DEMOBILIZE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF NAT'L GUARD, ON GROUND CRISIS OVER, OR TO REMOVE THEM TO LESS CRITICAL AREAS. IF REAL COOPERATION BETWEEN GRIVAS AND GREEK ARMY IS POSSIBLE, AS BOSSIDES SAYS IT IS, THEY COULD GREATLY REDUCE MAKARIOS' CAPACITY TO MAKE TROUBLE AND COULD SUPPRESS TROUBLE, UNDER ARRANGEMENTS WITH THIMAYYA, BEFORE TURKS COULD GET INTO IT.

IT WOULD BE WISE ALSO IF THE GREEK ARMY - - AFTER THIS POLICY HAS BEEN STATED - - WOULD TAKE OVER THE MATTER

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OF THE RELIEF AND RETENTION OF THE TURKISH CONTINGENT. THEIR STATEMENT TO MAKARIOS SHOULD BE THAT THIS WAS A HARMLESS RIGHT WHICH TURKS CLAIMED UNDER A TREATY WHICH THE GOG HAD GUARANTEED. WHATEVER MAKARIOS MIGHT SAY ABOUT LEGAL SITUATION, GOG WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS MINOR MATTER AND POSSIBLY FIGHT TURKS OVER IT. IF MAKARIOS CONTINUED TO REFUSE PERMISSION FOR RELIEF, GREEK ARMY WOULD MEET THE TURKS WITH ALL THE POMP OF A CHANGING OF THE GUARD AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, ESCORT THE NEW CONTINGENT TO NICOSIA AND THE OLD BACK TO FAMAGUSTA.

I DO NOT SEE HOW A MEETING OF NAC AT ANY LEVEL CAN HELP MUCH HERE UNLESS IN CASE OF BLOW-UP. THE MINISTERS WILL ONLY ALERT AND ENRAGE MAKARIOS PERMANENTLY. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WILL NOT GET ANY FURTHER THAN THEY DID OVER THE BUILDUP. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT U.S. AND U.K. MIGHT SAY TO TURKS THAT IN THEIR OPINION TROOPS OF NATO POWERS NOW ON ISLAND, AND ENGAGED IN THIS PACIFIC WORK OF SEPARATING POSSIBLE ANTAGONISTS WHOSE BELLIGERENCY MIGHT LEAD TO AN ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE THE ISLAND ON THE TROOPS THEMSELVES, WHERE WITHIN THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF NAT FROM SUCH OUTSIDE ATTACK. THIS COULD BE SAID SECRETLY WITHOUT HUMILIATING THE TURKS OR

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GIVING GREEKS A CHANCE TO LEAK AND GLOAT.

FINALLY, WHEN GREEKS WERE READY TO PRODUCE ENOSIS, THEY COULD SAY THAT IT WAS UNCONDITIONAL, AS IT WOULD INDEED BE SINCE THE TURKS WOULD HAVE MISSED THE BUS. THE GREEKS SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO MEET WITH THE TURKS UNDER THE AEGIS OF SACEUR AND REVIEW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF MILITARY SECURITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TO WORK OUT ALL PROBLEMS IN FRATERNAL SPIRIT, AND CONSIDER WITH TURKS A NEW ERA IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS SIGNALIZED BY CREATION NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR SOLUTION ALL PROBLEMS AND PURSUIT OF THEIR VERY GREAT COMMON INTERESTS. WHETHER OR NOT NEW INSTITUTIONS OF THIS SORT COULD BE BROUGHT INTO BEING, GREEK SHOULD DECLARE AND SHOW BY CONCRETE ACTS, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER ENOSIS, HER DETERMINATION TO ENSURE AT ALL TIMES AND IN ALL WAYS THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIS.

WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS, TRYING TO KEEP OPEN GREEK ACTION AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WHAT PAPANDREOU DEEMS POSSIBLE AS REPORTED IN ATHENS 375. WE SHOULD CONTINUALLY REMIND TURKS THAT THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THEY WOULD RATHER HAVE NO SETTLEMENT THAN THE BEST ONE ONE WE THOUGH HAD ANY CHANCE. THIS IS NOW WHAT THEY WILL

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GET, DUE TO REJECTION OF OUR PROPOSALS BY BOTH PARTIES.

WE SHOULD CONSTANTLY REPEAT THAT OUR POLICY NOW MUST BE DIRECTED TO PRIMARY PURPOSE OF PREVENTING COMMUNIZATION OF CYPRUS AND NOT THAT OF BRINGING GREECE AND TURKEY TO AGREEMENT. AT SAME TIME, WE MUST CONSTANTLY ENCOURAGE BOTH OF THEM TO KEEP IN MIND GREAT DESIRABILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT, BEFORE OR AFTER FACT OF ENOSIS, AND PUSH THEM IN THAT DIRECTION AS CONDITIONS ON ISLAND, HOPEFULLY, IMPROVE.

ANY MINATORY RUMBLE TO TURKS TO BALANCE THESE APPEALS TO THEIR BETTER NATURE, IF ANY, I LEAVE TO DEPARTMENT.  
GP-3. TUBBY

ADVANCE COPY S/S-O 4:21 PM 8/22/64

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 6:35 PM 8/22/64

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